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Abstract 
 
The corporate income tax (CIT) systems in place in developing countries can potentially be contributors 
or impediments to their economic development. This is especially relevant in the SADC region that has 
a set agenda regarding regional integration goals (SADC, 2019).  As part of economic integration, tax 
harmonisation benefiting all members through tax reform efforts is the central idea. Despite the 
importance of the topic, empirical literature remains scant, with Robinson (2005) being one of the few 
papers that directly models the determinants of CIT within SADC. This current paper is an attempt to 
revisit CIT determinants in the SADC region.  With a larger data base at the disposal of the authors, 
existing empirical literature could be suitably updated.  The sample period includes varying fortunes 
for developing countries in general and SADC specifically, namely, commodity booms and slumps 
following the global financial crises. Furthermore, given lower economic growth together with variable 
commodity prices since 2008, there is a concern that corporate tax revenue may continue to erode. A 
cross-section panel is utilised to find those factors that may best explain changes in corporate taxes in 
Southern Africa over time from 1980 to 2017.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Corporate income tax (CIT) systems can potentially be contributors or impediments to economic 
development of present developing countries with a particularly difficult dilemma.  On the one hand, 
their reliance on this tax is greater than in advanced economies. Limited tax administration and 
enforcement capacity puts a primacy on taxes that are easy to collect and enforce. Since CIT payments 
are usually concentrated to a few large taxpayers, the administrative benefits of corporate-level taxation 
relative to personal income tax systems are particularly relevant in the context of developing countries.   
On the other hand, such countries are likely to face particular pressure to maintain regimes attractive to 
multinational companies, so as to attract investment, jobs and technology (Dharmapal and Hines 2009: 
1063).  Thus, for poorer countries, corporate tax revenues as a proportion of total tax revenues are much 
more  important than for richer countries.  The IMF (2014) showed that developing countries are up to 
three times more vulnerable to negative effects of other countries’ tax rules and practices than developed 
nations.    
 
In this regard, Robinson (2005) argued that in developing countries, public needs should take 
precedence over  tax policies that generate uncertain revenue: The question being, is it the internal 
public needs, i.e. a coordinated effort that determine corporate income taxes (CIT), or external 
competitive pressures that determines corporate income tax rates in developing countries? Empirical 
evidence on this remains scant. Most existing studies focus on trends in corporate tax rates and changes 
in tax bases such as Keen and Simone (2004), Keen and Mansour (2010) and Abbas et al. (2012).  In 
the context of the SADC, a few recent studies have been published on tax coordination in the region: 
However, these studies tend to focus on indirect taxes, such as VAT (see Letete, 2012).   Robinson 
(2005) remains the only study that focusses on the determinants of corporate income tax in the SADC 
region.  
Since the early 2000’s, interesting trends in corporate tax rate and systems have been observed. For 
example, Norregard and Khan (2007) found that total tax revenues as a percentage of GDP did not 
increase significantly in least developed countries over the turn of this century. Corporate tax revenues, 
by contrast, increased from around 13% of total tax revenue from the 1990’s, to approximately 21% of 
total tax revenue in the 2000’s. This aligns with the theory that lower tax rates lead to higher collections 
as the intention to evade or avoid diminishes.  From there  it becomes imperative to investigate the 
determinants of corporate tax rates in developing countries in general and the SADC in particular.   
 
The hypothesis relates to the following:  Firstly, do external competitive pressures determine corporate 
income tax (CIT) rates in the SADC1 region?  If so, it is accepted that international and/or inter-regional 
pressure (tax competition) plays a vital role with varied consequences, especially also in terms of fiscal 
sustainability in the region.   Competition in this context might lead to a natural process of tax rate 
convergence, inhibiting the growth of governments and ultimately fiscal discipline and/or restraint.   
On the opposite side of the spectrum, it might lead to under-taxation and consequently an under-supply 
of government services and thus a “dilemma”, the so-called “race to the bottom”.  It is therefore essential 
to investigate whether this convergence, also in a macroeconomic sense, has been taking place and what 
the future outcome may hold for Southern Africa.  Alternatively, if external factors are not responsible 
for these changes, one needs to accept that other influences are playing a role.  In an attempt to find 
these alternative factors affecting CIT-rates, one needs to explore the second hypothesis, i.e. whether 
internal or local pressure for public goods delivery determine the CIT-rates in the SADC region?  If this 
problem statement holds true, it is accepted that internal (local) pressure takes precedence in the 
determination of CIT-rates.  Internal needs for public goods delivery then becomes a priority, together 
with varied consequences (Robinson, 2005). 
 
2. Background 
 
Together, the 15 SADC Member States have a population of over 200 million with an expanding 
consumer class, but many SADC economies are too small to draw significant investment on their own.  
Thus, regional integration and cooperation are at the centre of the organisation as a means of creating a 
more attractive environment for foreign investment. Tax coordination and harmonisation are regarded 
as basic requirements for economic integration. It is from this background that SADC’s Memorandum 
of Understanding on Co-operation in Taxation and Related Matters and the SADC Protocol on Finance 
and Investment are seen as tools, which are intended to achieve coordination and harmonisation of 
taxation laws within the region and avoid harmful tax competition with each other through tax 
incentives (IMF, 2015b).  However, the implementation of the guidelines and the protocol is lagging 
behind (Letete, 2010 Diakité et al., 2017 and Ade et al., 2017). There remains a wide range of incentives 
with overlapping and sometimes incoherent mandates. Current taxation regimes are often complex, with 
most countries applying tax reliefs that vary depending on the type of investment, its location, activity 
or ownership structure (e.g. domestic versus foreign-owned business). Many tax incentives remain 
discretionary and there is uncertainty as to whether they meet their intended objectives (UNCTAD, 
2015). 
 
The structure of many developing economies, with many small producers operating outside the formal 
sector or officially exempt on the grounds of their size, could lead to high dependence of revenue 
authorities on a few large businesses. In terms of tax revenue to GDP ratios, DRC is less than 13 per 
cent, Angola, Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania are between 13 and 18 per cent, with the remainder of the 
SADC members above 18 per cent. For some countries, the tax revenue to GDP target is still below the 
minimum level of 20 per cent considered by the UN as necessary to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals.  South Africa (27%) finds itself ahead of other countries such as  Australia 
(22,2%), Brazil (12,7%) and the United States (11,9%). The world average, according to the IMF, was 
15,4% in 2017.  Consideration that social security contributions are not included, and that child, 
disability and old age grants or universal credits are excluded, should be borne in mind. 
Whether a high GDP-to-tax ratio is a good or a bad thing is dependent upon each country’s view. For a 
nation that has a high ratio, where taxpayers are receiving good value for money, a high tax burden 
 
1 SADC or the Southern African Development Community consists of member countries Angola; Botswana; Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland (Etikwini), Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
might not be that detrimental. Countries such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway have high tax-to-GDP 
ratios, but these nations also report the highest standard of living. 
A very low tax-to-GDP ratio can be problematic as it may be a sign of an inefficient tax system. A 
government will struggle to provide services, build infrastructure or maintain public goods if it fails to 
collect taxes during periods of strong economic growth. The tax-to-GDP ratio alone provides no 
indication of good governance, the efficiency of the taxation system in the country, nor the way in which 
taxes are used or distributed. 
However, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries that rely on South Africa for revenue 
are in close proximity, with countries such as Lesotho’s tax to GDP at 29.1 per cent and Namibia at 
30.8 per cent per cent.  .  In developed countries, such as Denmark and the United Kingdom this ratio 
was  33 per cent (StatsSA, 2019).  Base broadening is thus still an objective for less developed regions 
such as Southern Africa, where economic growth is still low in South Africa together with a resultant 
high unemployment rate.  
 
 
 
 
This is particularly alarming in the context of the literature that shows that, a lack of a certain level of 
harmonisation of the national tax systems and a lack of harmonised tax policy could compromise SADC 
integration as a whole (e.g. IMF, 2015b: 30). 
 
3. Literature review 
 
The origin of tax competition literature 
 
Tax competition is presented in the academic literature as a game between two or more countries that 
choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively their tax policy, usually their tax rate, on an 
internationally mobile tax base, usually capital.  In simple terms, tax competition includes the welfare 
effect of one country’s tax policy when goods and/or factors of production are traded internationally.  
It therefore deals with various measures or strategies that can be taken by governments on the same or 
horizontal level, but also different or vertical levels to adjust their tax rates or reconsider their tax 
systems (especially tax bases), in order to attract mobile factors of production from other regions.  Tax 
competition therefore does not only occur through the lowering of tax rates, but also from changes or 
distortions in tax bases that are less visible and more difficult to assess.  Mobile tax bases include income 
from sales and services (commodities), income and assets from labour, income from rentals and 
royalties, income from portfolio capital (interest income), and income from corporate profits or 
investment capital. 
 
The pioneer works on tax competition are Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin 
(1988), and Kanbur and Keen (1993). The model of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) reflected a 
situation in which two small economies that are not able to influence interest rates, compete with each 
other for capital.  By lowering its own tax rate in the model, a country is able to extract capital from the 
other country, as capital will locate itself where the cost is lowest.  Since both countries will adopt the 
same strategy, this will inevitably lead to a “race to the bottom”. 
 
Since capital is far more mobile than other production factors, the focus of research on tax competition 
lies on the taxation of capital income. That is, the elasticity for the supply of capital is relatively high, 
making reduction of the cost of having capital, such as corporate income taxes as one of the factors, an 
attractive opportunity for governments to attract capital. This mobility induces some international spill-
overs in the design of national tax policy. Interdependencies (fiscal externalities) trigger a “race to the 
bottom”, as each country tries to attract a disproportionate share of the mobile capital tax base. In 
equilibrium, tax rates are lower in both countries than they would otherwise be, resulting in lower tax 
revenues and/or a shift of the tax burden to immobile tax bases. 
 
Nearly all the models considered above predict that capital mobility decreases the source-based tax on 
the mobile factor (capital) and shifts the tax burden towards immobile factors (labour), Capital mobility 
also decreases tax revenues and the provision of public goods, thereby undermining the fairness and 
social acceptance of tax. There are, however, counteracting or mitigating factors, including size of the 
country, agglomeration benefits, foreign ownership, political pressure. The strength of each of these 
factors is largely an empirical issue. 
 
Tax competition literature can be extended to include various other theories.  In an open economy, 
governments often cannot fully tax foreign destined  income due to capital flight (tax evasion) or the 
manipulation of transfer prices within multinational corporations).  Governments are not always 
inclined to report to foreign fiscal authorities on, for instance, income from those residents investing 
abroad (Baccheta and Espinosa, 1992 and 1995).  .  However, double taxation agreements and exchange 
of information has occurred internationally.  Empirical evidence has been provided in terms of tax 
enforcement problems (tax evasion) and thus the survival of capital income taxes (Gordon, 1992).  
 
Based on models such as that of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), a small body of literature started to 
develop that tried to give insight in how countries determine their corporate tax rates.  Variables 
employed in these types of studies include country-specific determinants. According to the public 
finance literature, understanding tax systems requires an understanding of their interaction with the 
quality of institutions and economic structure (e.g. Auerbach et al. 2013). It also includes external 
pressures such as the effect of economic integration within a region (e.g. Devereux et al., 2008 and 
Devereux, Griffith & Klemm, 2005). 
 
Country-specific determinants of corporate tax rates are especially relevant in the developing country 
context.  Wilson (1991) argued that smaller countries face a more elastic supply of capital curve. As a 
consequence, lowering corporate tax rates will have a relatively larger beneficial effect in terms of 
attracting capital (Wilson 1999, 278) and has a smaller base of local investors, so that pressures to cut 
tax rates are likely to be stronger (e.g. Bucovetsky, 1991). 
 The advantage of size reduces fiscal stress in small countries because it broadens the revenue base; 
directly through capital inflows and higher revenues from capital taxation and indirectly, because the 
capital inflows push up the capital–labour ratio (i.e., labour becomes relatively more scarce, which 
increases its worth) and thus fuel revenues from labour and consumption taxation. 
 
4. Empirical evidence 
 
Empirical research on this matter yielded mixed results.  When looking at the effects of wealth, size 
and openness, Mutti (2003) did find consistently significant support for Wilson’s claim when analysing 
three different periods, by using dummy variables to distinguish between small and large countries 
based on population size. Bretschger and Hettich (2002), using size as an exogenous variable and 
openness as an endogenous one, found a negative relationship between the effective capital tax rates 
and size.  Although, this too was not statistically significant.  Other empirical research with less focus 
on the size-factor, also found mixed results: De Nood (2012) does find rather strong evidence for a 
positive relationship between statutory tax rates and the size for European countries between 1981 and 
2010, when using a multitude of proxies for the size factor; though Overesch and Rincke (2011) did not 
find such a relationship at all, using a rather similar data set, including 32 European countries between 
1983 and 2006.   These discrepancies raise the question whether there in fact is a difference between 
small and large countries, as Wilson (1991) explained it. Rixen and Dietsch (2016) show that corporate 
tax rates are significantly associated with country size using a sample of 110 countries in 2010. By and 
large, small countries do try to cash in on their advantage of size as hypothesized by economic theory, 
though conclusions generally point to the structural advantage of small size really being an advantage 
of small democracies. 
 
Other country-specific factors that help in explaining corporate tax rates, as Slemrod (2004), Mutti 
(2003), Clausing (2007) and others note, is the level of the individual tax rate of a particular country. 
Corporate income taxes work as a sort of “backstop” to personal income taxes.  That is, as personal 
income tax rates increase, corporations will try to reclassify labour income as general business income, 
to defer taxation on the personal level.  Overesch and Rincke (2011) found a positive relationship 
between the two variables.  
 
It is reasonable to expect that there would be a relationship between revenue needs for expenditures and 
corporate tax rates, as proxied by government expenditure as G:GDP: Slemrod (2004) used this variable 
in explaining statutory tax rates.  
 
Since economic integration tends to increase the mobility of capital, it is generally accepted that 
economic integration leads to lower taxation on corporate income. Empirical evidence in this regard 
remains mixed. Earlier researchers, including Garret (1995), Slemrod (2004) Clausing (2007) and De 
Nood (2012), found a significant negative relationship between openness and corporate tax burdens: 
That is, a higher level of trade or economic openness leads to higher capital mobility and thus to a higher 
elasticity of capital supply. Kumar and Quinn (2012) found no general negative relationship between 
financial globalization and corporate tax rates and revenues: Results vary according to country 
grouping, with OECD countries showing a positive relationship: The United States exhibits a 
“Stackelberg” type of leadership on other countries; trade integration is inversely correlated with tax 
rates and public sentiment and ideology affect tax rates. This relates to the argument of Leibrecht and 
Hochgatterer (2012) that corporate tax rates may fall for reasons other than tax competition. Such 
reasons include  ‘common intellectual trends’ such as tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening approaches, 
due to concerns about the deadweight loss of taxation resulting from high tax rates (Devereux, Griffith 
and Klemm, 2005) and changes in the political climate towards a more business-friendly environment 
(Musgrave, 1990; Persson and Tabellini, 2000).  
 
Empirical evidence on corporate income tax developments in developing economies remains scant. 
Most of the existing studies focus on trends in corporate tax rates and changes in tax bases. These studies 
include Keen and Simone (2004), Keen and Mansour (2010) and Abbas et al. (2012). In the African 
context Petersen (2010) provide a detailed overview of the basics of the East African Community (EAC) 
integration and tax harmonisation process. The review is aligned to Doe (2006), who highlighted the 
importance of harmonising domestic consumption taxes in Central and Western African countries 
towards improved revenue positions for countries in the regions. 
In the context of the SADC, a few recent studies have been published on tax coordination in the region, 
though these studies tend to focus on indirect taxes, such as VAT. Previous studies on taxation in the 
SADC (Letete, 2012) have largely been theoretical and have principally focused on the possibility of 
harmonising indirect taxes (mainly value added tax or VAT).  More recent studies by Ade et al. (2017) 
shows some important policy implications for the SADC (given its heterogeneous nature), aimed at 
enhancing the process of regional tax harmonisation. There is a need for the SADC to develop policies 
aimed at collectively expanding the corporate tax base so as to accommodate the relatively low optimum 
CIT rates: This is of particular importance, as the adoption of lower optimum CIT rates may lead to a 
reduction in tax revenue or the opposite even. However, Robinson (2005) remains the only study that 
focuses on the determinants of corporate income tax in the SADC region.  
 
5. Methodology 
 
In this section, the design of a suitable model that can fully or partly explain changing tendencies over 
time in CIT in Southern Africa, becomes essential.  Before this can be done, it is important to first 
observe and investigate real-life data and patterns, which can easily be observed on the surface.  As a 
first step, the prevailing situation in the SADC region is detailed, so as to understand any shortcomings 
that may occur in the empirical analysis.  The second step involves the acknowledgement of observable 
patterns in CIT over time. In the third and final step, the model is presented, with the intention of 
highlighting the causes for changing patterns in CIT over time.    
 
5.1 Data analysis 
 
As previously noted, taxation levels could also relate to the level of development in these countries.  
The level of development normally determines the size of the tax base, but also affects a country’s 
capacity to administer taxes. Low state capacity also reduces governments’ ability to cope with the 
negative fiscal consequences of tax competition. On the one hand, it becomes more difficult to police 
and prevent cross-border tax avoidance and evasion by rich domestic citizens and profitable companies; 
whilst on the other hand, given the large informal sector, it is difficult for governments to increase 
revenues by shifting the tax burden to labour and consumption. International tax competition thus 
compounds the domestic problems of raising tax revenues.  
 
Varying degrees of development can be observed within the SADC according to the World Bank 
classification.  Countries such as the DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe are 
classified as low-income developing countries.  Countries such Lesotho, Swaziland and Zambia are 
classified as low middle-income developing countries.  Angola, Botswana (“low tax rate country”, 
Mauritius “(low tax rate country”), Namibia and South Africa are upper middle-income countries.  
Seychelles is regarded as a high-income country, whilst also being a “low tax rate country”.  Some of 
these countries have already started with improved tax administration efforts in order to broaden their 
tax base. 
 
Several studies also reported changes in the effective tax burden in the region.  Effective taxation relates 
to various aspects concerning the decision-making process to invest, i.e. the user cost of capital.  Keen 
and Mansour (2010) found that corporate tax bases have narrowed in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially 
through the spread of tax holidays and special zones, but surprisingly, tax revenues have held steady in 
this region. Several other papers highlighted the fact that Sub Saharan Africa is an outlier in terms of 
changes in the tax base over time, which was on average narrower. This is attributed to the widespread 
use of tax incentives granted under special regimes, which has brought effective tax rates close to zero 
in many countries and a “partial race to the bottom” (Abbas et al, 2012). All the countries in Southern 
Africa have some special tax regime in place where in some instances it is brought close to zero. These 
trends confirm anecdotal evidence of governments in some low-income economies attempting to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) with extremely generous incentive schemes; though good governance, 
infrastructure and financial markets are needed for sustainable FDIs  (Munongo & Robinson, 2017). 
 
The above-mentioned papers, however, only report a count of the number of special regimes in a 
country and do not track their generosity or calculate their impact on effective tax rates:  These issues 
will be addressed throughout the following discussion.   
 
5.2 Changes in CIT rates in SADC, 1980-2017 
 
So as to achieve an overall picture of the changing patterns and tendencies in CIT, Table 1 provides an 
overview of the mean and standard deviation of the statutory and average tax rates.  The average tax 
rates represent a ratio of CIT revenues to GDP.  In this regard, it is important to continuously take all 
shortcomings into consideration when utilising pure statutory CIT rates. 
 
Table 1:  Changes in corporate taxation in the SADC region, 1980-2015 
Years Statutory rate   Average rate   
              Mean  S.D.              Mean  S.D. 
1980 0.4432 0.0549 0.0445 0.0261 
1980-1985 0.4539 0.0570 0.0459 0.0289 
1980 0.4432 0.0549 0.0445 0.0261 
1980-1990 0.4128 0.0765 0.0349 0.0349 
1980 0.4432 0.0549 0.0400 0.0194 
1980-1995 0.3617 0.0542 0.0425 0.0340 
1985 0.4539 0.0570 0.0542 0.0289 
1985-1990 0.4128 0.0765 0.0598 0.0349 
1985 0.4539 0.0537 0.0542 0.0190 
1985-1995 0.3617 0.0542 0.0425 0.0340 
1990 0.4128 0.0765 0.0598 0.0349 
1990-1995 0.3617 0.0542 0.0425 0.0340 
1990 0.4128 0.0765 0.0598 0.0349 
1990-2000 0.3303 0.0685 0.0209 0.0143 
1990 0.4128 0.0765 0.0598 0.0349 
1990-2005 0.3237 0.0687 0.0209 0.0143 
2000 0.3303 0.0685 0.0209 0.0143 
2000-2005 0.3110 0.0825 0.0188 0.0921 
2000 0.3303 0.0685 0.0209 0.0143 
2000-2010 0.2860 0.1010 0.0204 0.0107 
2005 0.2390 0.1132 0.0201 0.0103 
2005-2010 0.2390 0.1132 0.0215 0.0115 
2005-2015 0.2390 0.1132 0.0220 0.0105 
Source:  Author’s calculations for different sets of country-year observations  
similar to Slemrod (2004). 
 
The methodology used in Table 1 is similar to that of Slemrod (2004) and various other authors, with 
some minor adjustments.  These calculations are being made by taking the first and end figures for the 
calendar year and added together and the results are then divided by 15 to get the average.  The standard 
deviation is then also calculated from these figures.  Each pair of intervals between 1980 and 2015 is 
conducted only for those countries where data is available for the beginning and ending year.  
 
5.3 Trends in tax rates:  Developing versus SADC 
 
It can be observed that developing regions such as SADC closely follow declining tendencies, which 
since 1985 occurred in statutory CIT rates in the industrialised world.   
   
In practice, developing countries have been cutting headline and effective CIT rates as have advanced 
countries, but they have made tax bases narrower rather than broader.  Between 1985-1995 the mean 
statutory rate fell sharply from 45 to 36 per cent and continued into the 1990-1995 interval.  The 
dispersion in these rates was at its highest in the latter interval, but started to stabilise during 1990-2005, 
which continued until 2015.  For the average CIT rates, the largest decline in the mean and standard 
deviation occurred during 1990-2000, with the standard deviation stabilising from 2000-2005.  From 
2005 to 2015, the statutory rate again fell to 24 per cent.  The data for the statutory CIT rates were not 
available and the average tax rates were used, i.e. tax revenue as percentage of GDP.  Torslov et al. 
(2018) found that between 1985 and 2018, the global average statutory corporate tax rate fell by more 
than half, from 49 to 24 per cent.  Torslov et al. (2018) argue that profit shifting is a key driver of the 
decline in corporate income tax rates. An IMF study of 2012, looked at corporate income tax regimes 
in 50 emerging and developing economies during 1996, but found no evidence of a global “race to the 
bottom” for standard tax systems. However, for special regimes, the “race to the bottom” has long taken 
place, with effective tax rates close to zero. 
 
In the next section, an alternative procedure is followed in determining changing patterns and trends in 
CIT in the SADC region. The idea is to determine whether internal or external factors influence CIT 
and whether a regime of tax competition is being followed.  
 
5.4 Empirical model 
 
The discussion thus far suggests that a general empirical/prospective model as used by Robinson (2005) 
and Devereux & Loretz (2011), by explaining the impact of various independent variables on the 
statutory CIT-rate which could accept the following mathematical form: 
 
Where:  is the country dummy that represents country specific factors; 
 is the time dummy that represents the change over time; 
 representing the different coefficients; and  
X the different SADC members involved.   
 
The data used in the pooled estimations were mostly obtained from the International Financial Statistics 
(Government Financial Statistics), and the World Bank.  The panel covers the period 1980 to the end 
of 2015.  It is a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) of one tax rate measure plus a constant term.  
Developing regions such as SADC closely followed declining tendencies in CIT rates, as also observed 
 ittiit XXXXXXXCIT ...77665544332211 +++++++++=
in the industrialised world.  Between 1985-1995 the statutory and average rate fell, but this continuous 
fall only gained momentum or significance from 1995 onwards (Table 1). 
 
Various econometric techniques have been tried and tested beforehand in order to find the most suitable 
for the study at hand.  The so-called WITHIN and LSDV estimations, as well as random effects have 
been included in these.  Finally, the SUR analysis (Zelner, 1962) that takes fixed effects into account 
was decided upon.  This technique has also recently been used in other research (Aide, 2017).  Table 2 
shows the results concerning the statutory CIT rates.  The first pair regressions are pooled least-squares 
regressions, with the first pair having only the internal or local variables (columns 1 and 2 for SACU), 
and the second pair of regressions having both local and international or external variables (column 3 
and 4 for SADC). 
 
Although there are some shortcomings to this method, the investigation attempts to eliminate these 
through the SUR analysis.  This analysis makes provision for any further unexplained factors through 
taking the error term into account.  If any linkages (information) exist between countries that 
irreversibly bond the countries through common grounds, which would most probably be the case for 
an economic block such as SADC, the SUR analysis would account for this.  Common factors could 
for instance, include high HIV-AIDS infection ratios and high absolute poverty levels. 
 
All results delivered good R-squares, i.e. well-fitted or explained models.  The explanatory power of 
the independent variables in terms of the applicable dependent variable was thus good (see Table 2).  
 
5.5 Statutory CIT rates 
 
It is sometimes difficult to estimate the corporate tax base, as issues such as defining depreciation, 
measuring capital gains, costing inventories and accounting for inflation also require consideration.  
Economic or pure profits are therefore not always that clear-cut,  
 
5.5.1 Dependent Variable: CIT rates 
 
The statutory tax rate was chosen because it is transparent and easy to use, based on available evidence 
where corporations take this into account.  Statutory corporate income tax rates do influence 
corporations in their decision where to shift their profits to (Devereux et al., 2008). Moreover, it is a 
measurement of the corporate tax burden that is a lot easier to work with. For these reasons, it is also 
the dependent variable of interest in this study. 
 
The most common measure to use is the (top marginal) statutory corporate income tax rate.  Some 
studies on tax competition use effective average tax rates (EATR) as a proxy for taxing the burden. The 
EATR is a measurement that includes the statutory rate, as well as deductions, exemptions and other 
credits.  The effective tax burden relates to various aspects concerning the decision-making process to 
invest (user cost of capital).  The effective tax rate of a corporation is normally a complex function of 
the statutory tax rate on corporate income, the extent of double taxation relief and the definition of the 
tax base, including the system of depreciation (King and Fullerton, 1984; OECD, 1991; Razin and 
Sadka, 1993).  Withholding taxes, income exemption, special allowances, deduction and investment 
schemes become relevant  
 
However, the calculation of EATR is subject to many assumptions, as it tries to simulate   real 
investment decisions. Thus, it is not coherent in its use across multiple researches. Additionally, the 
added value of using EATRs is debatable. As Overesch (2005) argued,  the main driver in the 
differences of EATRs between different countries is the statutory corporate income tax rate component. 
 
With the above-mentioned as background, it is essential to note that not only is the “rent” element 
important for SMME’s, but natural resource companies tend to have a high “rent” (royalty) component.  
The SADC region has a vast natural resource base and each country has a different way of taxing these.  
Some countries use differentiated CIT rates on different resources, whilst others use unique formulas 
designed for a specific natural resource (e.g. the tax formula used for gold production in South Africa).   
 
The following models are used in the different columns of Table 2:   
 
Column 1 
Ln_CIT = f(ln_PIT; ln_PITNOCAP; ln_GOVEXP; SR) 
Column 2 
Ln_CIT = f(ln_PIT; ln_PITNOCAP; ln_GOVEXP; SR; O) 
Column 3 
Ln_CIT = f(ln_PIT; ln_PITNOCAP; ln_GOVEXP; ln_W; SR) 
Column 4 
Ln_CIT = f(ln_PIT; ln_PITNOCAP; ln_GOVEXP; ln_W; SR; O) 
Where the variables can be described as follows: 
Statutory corporate income tax rate CIT:  These rates are taken from several issues of 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Corporate Tax: A Worldwide Summary.  Statutory CIT correspond 
to the marginal CIT rate at the top bracket for central (national) government only. 
Statutory personal income tax rate PIT:  These rates are taken from several issues of PWCs Individual 
Tax:  A Worldwide Summary.  These rates correspond to the marginal individual income tax rate at the 
top bracket for the central government only. 
Statutory personal income tax rate PIT interact with an indicator for the presence of capital gains tax 
PITNOCAP: (=1 if there is no capital gains taxation, adopting PIT value for that specific year, and 0 
otherwise).  These are taken from PWCs Individual Tax:  A Worldwide Summary. 
 
The personal income tax rate (PITR) on the other hand is expected to have a positive effect on the 
corporate income tax rates.  This will mainly be due to governments using the corporate income tax as 
a backstop from personal income tax avoidance (Slemrod, 2004).  To assess this effect, the top marginal 
income rates from the countries to be researched have been used.  Also, the size of the economy has 
been included in the equation, measured by a country’s GDP. There is little consent on the size-effect 
in the empirical literature.  
 
 
5.5.3 Internal/local variables 
 
Central government expenditure as ratio of GDP GOVEXP:  Government expenditures are taken from 
several issues of the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics.   
Government spending as a fraction of GDP.  As explained previously, the coefficient of this variable 
should be insignificant.  
 
Withholding Tax W:  This is a tax on earnings (royalties, management fees), interest or dividend 
payments deducted at source.  The tax is designed to simplify the collection of tax and to ensure that 
tax is not evaded.  By taxing dividends due for repatriation, it is hoped that foreign-owned companies 
will be encouraged to invest in the country where its subsidiary is located. 
Source/Residence principle SR:  A dummy variable was included to describe the method of 
international taxation, either a source or residence principle.  
 
5.5.4 External/international variable 
 
Openness is expected to carry a negative sign. That is, greater capital mobility increases the elasticity 
of capital supply and hence drives down corporate tax rates. It is measured as the fraction of imports 
and exports of GDP.  
 
Exports and Imports  O:  Exports plus Imports divided by GDP, i.e. X + M/GDP.  See World Bank’s 
World Development Indicator. 
 
Table 2:  Regressions in terms of the statutory CIT-rate (SACU and SADC) 
 
Dependant variable:  Statutory CIT rate 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Ln_PIT 0.96225 1.0177 0.044912 0.0598 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (-0.0016)** (0.0000)*** 
Ln_PITNOCAP -0.031961 -0.0496 -0.034856 0.480476 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** -0.0094*  (0.0000)*** 
Ln_GOVEXP -0.05696 -2.642435 0.722378 -0.727054 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***  (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** 
Ln_W     -0.407 -0.150526 
      (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
SR 0.274652 0.247063 0.131215 0.274652 
  (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***  (0.0000)*** (0.0000***) 
O   -0.007511   -0.006354 
    (0.0000)***   (0.0000)*** 
Constant     0.630242 0.3765 
      (-0.0016)** (0.0000)*** 
Observations 128 128 159 307 
Number of groups 5 5 12 12 
R 2 0.9754 0.9944 0.7154 0.8892 
 
Note: p-values are in brackets and ***indicates significant at 1% level, **indicates significant at 5% 
level and *indicates significant at 10% level.  All data is expressed in natural logarithms except for data 
with negative values. 
 
It might be more appropriate to administer a fully or partially integrated system: I.e. the CIT acts as a 
withholding tax of corporate-source income and is, in the absence of a preferential treatment of capital 
gains, credited in full at shareholder’s level (providers of capital).  A differentiation (and even 
discrimination) between retained (corporate profits) and distributed profits (dividends) is also common 
in the SADC region.  Corporate taxation may also involve a double taxation problem (classical system).  
Corporate profits are taxed in the hands of the corporation (CIT), but also on shareholders (PIT on 
dividends).  Each SADC member deals with the problem of double taxation differently. 
 In the SADC region where withholding tax rates (from 5 to 25 per cent, depending on the type of income 
involved) are still of utmost importance and double taxation agreements are rare or non-existent (South 
Africa has the most extensive list of them all), it is not surprising that a strong negative relationship is 
present in terms of CIT rates: This could mean that these countries need to adjust their CIT rates 
downwards when withholding tax rates move in the opposite direction.  Some double taxation 
agreements already exist to make provisions for credits on double taxation.  Another variable that is 
also related in this context, is the dummy variable that considers whether the country is on a source or 
residence (SR) system, which is significant and points to the sensitivity in terms of CIT rates.   
 
The government expenditure-to-GDP ratio is negatively related, with the CIT rate in the pooled 
estimation (columns 1, 2 & 4).  Though it becomes positive in the SADC region, where only local 
variables are used, it becomes negative as soon as the openness variable is added:  This is to be expected, 
for the higher the spending, the more pressure there is on the CIT rates to become more competitive in 
terms of capital income tax systems.  Only variables for which the data was available were included in 
this study. 
 
The presence-of-trade variable (O) is determined as follows: Exports (X)/Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) + Imports (Z)/Gross Domestic Expenditure (GDE)/2.  It partly gives an indication of trade 
openness in the region.  This variable is negatively associated with the CIT rate both for the pooled and 
fixed effects estimators, where all international variables are present.  This result could be indicative of 
lower CIT rates with higher trade ratios and therefore international pressure to lower the CIT rates; it 
should be read with caution, as other factors also play a definite role in terms of a country’s openness. 
 
Various other variables were also sourced, such as population, which showed that an increase in the 
population still leads to decreased CIT rates.   
 
From Table 1 it appears that there has been some pressure in the region to cut CIT statutory rates since 
1985, with more urgency between 2005 to 2015, potentially indicating the possibility of strategic action 
and some tax competition.   
 
5.6 Tax coordination not equally important in all countries 
 
“For the countries that have large economies, good infrastructure, natural resources and attractive non-
tax related FDI determinants, the case for tax harmonisation does not appear to be overwhelming. 
However, for countries that have small economies, poor infrastructure, relatively low levels of natural 
resources and less attractive non-tax related FDI determinants, the merits for tax policy harmonisation 
may be more appealing” (Ade et al. 2018); as can be observed from the SACU agreement, with smaller 
economies following the leader, which in this case is South Africa. 
 
From the study, it appears that tax policies take precedence over public needs and as such, external 
competitive pressure determines CIT rates.   This can also be seen from a country such as South Africa, 
where most of the tax revenue collected is derived from personal income taxation and not corporate 
income taxation.  Emerging and/or developing regions thus tend to under-tax capital, specifically the 
more elastic capital outflows. Even Adam Smith (1776) acknowledged that capital has never been the 
“citizen of any country”. Tax havens2 have become a familiar sight in order to avoid current & future 
taxes, and exchange controls.  Whereas the OECD and the EU lend credence to the claim of “harmful 
preferential tax regimes” and attempt to “blacklist” these countries, Tanzi (1995) suggests the 
establishment of a World Tax Organisation to deal with global tax harmonisation issues.  
 
 
2 Ginsberg (1991: 15) provides a full account of taxation relief categories such as tax exemption (tax paradises or “no tax” havens), low 
taxation (tax shelters), special incentive privileges, tax exemption for manufacturing & processing of exports, and international CIT-reduction 
Countries do not appear to give much attention to their own macroeconomic environment when 
determining their statutory corporate tax rates. This is represented by the low level of significance of 
the country-specific determinants.  The only effect that shows consistent significance is the effect of the 
personal income tax rate as previously indicated. indicating governments appear to use the corporate 
income tax more as a backstop to the personal income tax.  Other than this backstop effect, no 
consistently significant country-specific determinants were found. Indeed, corporate tax rates do not 
appear to be geared towards the spending behaviour of governments, as indicated by research conducted 
by Slemrod (2004).  Moreover, the effect size can be contested: I.e. even when not including the 
strategic interaction variable, it is only marginally significant.   
 
6 Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, a cross-section panel (pooled and SUR analysis) was utilised to find the factors that best 
explain changes in corporate taxes over time.  The outcome of low taxes, that is higher levels of capital 
investment, has long been questioned in literature. The main question is whether governments in 
developing countries, such as those in the SADC region, set their public needs first over everything 
else, including over inefficient tax policies that might generate uncertain revenues?  If so, is it the 
internal public needs that determine corporate income taxes (CIT), or external competitive pressures 
(as part of a globalised environment)?   
 
As noted, it is widely accepted that tax competition could have an array of consequences or outcomes.  
Competition in this context might lead to a natural process of tax rate convergence and thus a limitation 
on the growth of governments.  On the opposing side of the spectrum, it might lead to under-taxation 
and consequently an under-supply of government services and thus a “dilemma”.  It is therefore 
essential to investigate whether this convergence, also in a macroeconomic sense, has been taking place 
and what the future outcome may hold for SADC.  In order to find a calculated outcome, it is essential 
to summarise the empirical results of the paper. 
 
The main findings in this paper have delivered interesting results: 
 
The first of which observes that the backstop scenario is applicable both in terms of the average and 
statutory CIT rate.  Here it makes perfect sense to accept that in countries with a higher PIT rate, the 
statutory CIT rate will also be higher, and that these countries will raise more CIT revenues when 
PIT rates increase, due to the direct link between the two rates (the differentiation between labour 
and business income with income linked to the GDP).  Further, the PITNOCAP variable is 
negatively related to the statutory rate, which means that if the capital gains tax rate increases, the 
CIT rate will decline. 
 
Secondly, in terms of the government expenditure variable (GOVEXP), the reality of strategic action 
in terms of tax competition becomes clear no matter what the level of government expenditure.  The 
government expenditure variable is negatively related to the statutory rate, where local and 
international variables are in place.  It seems that tax competition prevails no matter the level of 
government expenditure.   
 
Thirdly, in the SADC region where withholding tax rates are still of utmost importance, it is not 
surprising that a strong negative relationship is present in terms of the statutory CIT rates.  This 
could mean that these countries need to adjust their CIT rates downwards when withholding tax rates 
move in the opposite direction.  The dummy variable for statutory rates (SR) becomes relevant in 
this context.   
 
The fourth point is that the presence of trade variable (O) is negatively associated with the statutory 
CIT rate, where all international variables are present.  Although this result could be indicative of 
lower CIT rates with higher trade ratios and therefore international pressure to lower the CIT rates, 
it should be read with caution because other factors may also play a definite role.  This also tends to 
confirm the region’s dependency on trade for tax revenues, especially in terms of the SACU region 
and its relationship with South Africa.  Again, this is not an isolated issue and should also be seen 
in the light of capital mobility and the degree of doing business in the region. 
 
The analysis in this paper is not final.  This could mean that countries are pressurised into following 
competitive regimes when determining the statutory CIT rate as part of a globalised tax environment.  
Note should be taken of the fact that multinational companies tend to shift profits to tax havens no 
matter the levels of corporate tax rates.  More pressure is then put on the personal income tax base that 
needs to cover public expenditure needs.  With South Africa the so-called Stackelberg leader, the 
importance of sustainable economic growth needs to be emphasised.  Burger (2019: 364) emphasises 
the need in South Africa for a partnership between business, labour, public interest groups and citizens 
including the poor, to bring about much needed reform, excluding corruption.  Economic growth in 
South Africa results in economic wealth for Southern Africa and viable taxation bases for the future. 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
This research is not without its limitations.  Firstly, this paper focuses on the determinants of corporate 
tax rates and not on corporate tax bases or revenues. As previously mentioned, competition using tax 
bases is possible; though sourcing suitable data for review of this is very difficult, as tax laws regarding 
tax bases can be very complex and opaque. There are of course many other considerations countries 
weigh when competing with others:  These may include trade balances, the legal environment to set up 
corporations in relation to each other,  historical  ties  between  two  countries,  a common language to 
name a few. Future research could attempt to address some of these additional factors as a more 
comprehensive analysis.  
 
Implications 
 
This paper re-emphasises the importance of international pressure in terms of future tax policymaking.  
At the same time, it emphasises governments’ abilities to raise taxes and thus deliver services in future.  
Tax co-operation or harmonisation might become the preferred route in the SADC region in order to 
ensure its attractiveness as an investment destination, realising full benefit from future initiatives 
concerning regional integration efforts or schemes.  A careful review of future tax measures and 
strategies by the SADC tax-subcommittee has become essential to ensure fiscal sustainability and all 
importantly, macroeconomic stability increasing programmes such as NEPAD. 
 
 A fine balance between domestic public needs and external competitive pressures will therefore have 
to be maintained in future tax policies. The main question is whether governments in developing 
countries, such as those in the SADC region, set their public needs over everything else first, including 
those inefficient tax policies that might generate uncertain revenues?  If so, is it the internal public needs 
that determine corporate income taxes (CIT) or external competitive pressures (as part of a globalised 
environment)?   
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